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General John J. Pershing
General John J. Pershing
The strengths and weaknesses of General John J. Pershing as Commander-in-Chief of the American Expeditionary Forces has undergone scholarly revision over the last twenty years. Maintaining the AEF as an independent fighting force while the French and British pressured to amalgamate US troops into their armies is regarded as one of Pershing's greatest wartime feats. The General attracts criticism, however, for adhering to outdated tactical concepts, such as 'elan and marksmanship, in the face of modern mechanized warfare. There is much room for debate and discussion here.
First Division AEF
American Cantonments
The Battle of Cantigny
Twenty-Sixth "Yankee" Division
US Marines in the Great War
American Cantonments
The Battle of Cantigny
Twenty-Sixth "Yankee" Division
US Marines in the Great War
JeffreyLaMonica |
Latest page update: made by JeffreyLaMonica
, Jan 5 2009, 6:26 PM EST
(about this update
About This Update
Edited by JeffreyLaMonica
10 words added 1 image added view changes - complete history) |
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Keyword tags:
AEF
American Expeditionary Forces
General John J. Pershing
General Pershing
John Pershing
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| Started By | Thread Subject | Replies | Last Post | ||
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| Hermann1.5 | Pershing and rifle use | 0 | Jan 8 2009, 12:31 AM EST by Hermann1.5 | ||
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Thread started: Jan 8 2009, 12:31 AM EST
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General Pershing was right about rifle use. He of course could not describe it because there were no words to do so. “Marksman” is pre-industrial. “Sharpshooter” is latter 19th Century and equally vague. There is little else.
He could communicate with anyone knowing what he was talking about. The palaver would be rich with metaphors and other non-specific terms as his listeners knew no words either. To those who did not know what he was talking about, they were beyond the reach of language. Worse, they were beyond the therapeutic assistance of perception. What is there to see? A firing line has people who are standing there not doing much, or lying about as still as a bunch of people napping. Well, there is a lot of noise, but it is not related to anything as everyone makes the same amount. Whatever happens off in the distance, such as holes put in paper, cannot be related to what can be seen on the firing line. The finger movements, or whatever, cannot be graded, classified, interpreted, nor can anything else. Proficient rifle work is indistinguishable from the most wretched of performances. Language could capture and relate performance in the flintlock smoothbore days, when the scheme was to turn a row of shooters into a sort of giant shotgun. Technology straggled out of that mode but did not acquire a new coating of language to match its changes that were not related to hardware and accessories. Rifle performance in live-fire has left behind it a litter of missing pieces, misconceptions, and errors visible to those who know what Pershing was talking about, if they would ever happen to encounter something in the news or in history. Whether they noticed something or not, they could not comment on it because there was no language. |
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| meyati | American Horses | 2 | Sep 22 2008, 1:19 PM EDT by meyati | ||
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Thread started: Sep 21 2008, 1:15 AM EDT
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Years ago, I read a short and interesting article in a horse magazine, probably "Western Horseman". It was written by a vet about how the first horses sent to France for the American cavalry units were infected with severe distemper-the strangles-The French vets tried to treat them, but ended up destroying the horses. The next shipment also had strangles and had to be destroyed. The Americans insisted that the French provide horses, but the French refused to allow Americans near their horses. The French Army also forced American military veternarians to attend classes on equine health, in which the American vets learned a lot and appreciated the courses and new knowledge, at least the author appreciated his classes and new knowledge. The main causes were poor nutrition and sanitation, then the close quarters of being asea caused the epidemic. The US Army always had a vast supply of wild horses, so I guess that it was too easy for Americans to procure mounts.
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| JeffreyLaMonica | The tactical learning curve. | 3 | Jul 6 2008, 9:26 PM EDT by bobenglish | ||
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Thread started: Apr 7 2008, 9:14 PM EDT
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Recent studies on the AEF, including works by Mark Grotelueschen and Robert Ferrell, claim that the US Army showed some tactical innovation on the battlefield by the latter phases of the Meuse-Argonne Offensive. Was this true? If so, what accounted for the learning? Was it Pershing's leadership, effective training, or battlefield experience?
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