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Great War Books and Reviews
Books on the CEF
Books on the ANZACS
Books on the AEF
Books on the BEF
My 75
Books on the War in the Air
Books on Medical Care
Robert Mueller's Fields of War
Handbook of Imperial Germany
John Milton Cooper's Reconsidering Wilson
Reconsidering Woodrow Wilson: Progressivism, Internationalism, War and Peace, John Milton Cooper (ed.), John Hopkins, 2009, 359 + ix pages, index, notes, ISBN 978 0 8018 9074 1, $65 cloth. A series of essays examining Wilson’s political views, his domestic policies, programs and accomplishments, his international economic and diplomatic philosophy and his impact on America politics in years following 1920 up to today.
Despite sharply mixed judgments on the success of his presidency, Wilson ranks among the most activist and influential of all American chief executives. An educator and historian by training, Wilson is the only American President to have earned a Ph.D. He was a political scientist, prolific writer and political theorist, as well as a practical reformist politician. Taking office at the height of the Progressive Era, Wilson was a believer in the necessity and power of government to improve society. No populist, he favored pragmatic economic and social reform, working within the system to modify existing civil and economic institutions to better serve the needs of the majority.
Wilson was a legislative all-star creating the Federal Reserve System, a federal child labor law, the first federally-financed aid to farmers, the first graduated income tax and federal inheritance tax, a lower tariff, the Federal Trade Commission, new regulation of maritime shipping and an eight-hour day for railway workers among other accomplishments. His record on race relations was far less impressive. He permitted cabinet members to desegregate the federal government and to enforce without constraint the draconian war-time loyalty laws instituted in 1917 and 18.
It is, however, foreign affairs were Wilson’s actions are most remembered. Having almost single handedly led the United States into war in against Germany in 1917, he fought valiantly to create a New World Order based on self-determination, free trade and the collective security of the League of Nation to replace the failed European system of competing military alliances. Though often faulted for giving way too much to gain his League, Wilson bargained away nothing he held vitally importance in reaching agreement with French, British and Italians on a treaty ending World War I. Though America never joined Wilson’ League of Nations, the ideal of collective security it represented was resurrected after World War II and combined with a new alliance system (NATO) strong enough to keep the peace for half a century or more. Though Wilson did not apply his concept of self determination outside of Europe, it was after 1945 extended to Africa and Asia as his political thought, always flexible and pragmatic, evolved to meet new realities.
Len Shurtleff
Despite sharply mixed judgments on the success of his presidency, Wilson ranks among the most activist and influential of all American chief executives. An educator and historian by training, Wilson is the only American President to have earned a Ph.D. He was a political scientist, prolific writer and political theorist, as well as a practical reformist politician. Taking office at the height of the Progressive Era, Wilson was a believer in the necessity and power of government to improve society. No populist, he favored pragmatic economic and social reform, working within the system to modify existing civil and economic institutions to better serve the needs of the majority.
Wilson was a legislative all-star creating the Federal Reserve System, a federal child labor law, the first federally-financed aid to farmers, the first graduated income tax and federal inheritance tax, a lower tariff, the Federal Trade Commission, new regulation of maritime shipping and an eight-hour day for railway workers among other accomplishments. His record on race relations was far less impressive. He permitted cabinet members to desegregate the federal government and to enforce without constraint the draconian war-time loyalty laws instituted in 1917 and 18.
It is, however, foreign affairs were Wilson’s actions are most remembered. Having almost single handedly led the United States into war in against Germany in 1917, he fought valiantly to create a New World Order based on self-determination, free trade and the collective security of the League of Nation to replace the failed European system of competing military alliances. Though often faulted for giving way too much to gain his League, Wilson bargained away nothing he held vitally importance in reaching agreement with French, British and Italians on a treaty ending World War I. Though America never joined Wilson’ League of Nations, the ideal of collective security it represented was resurrected after World War II and combined with a new alliance system (NATO) strong enough to keep the peace for half a century or more. Though Wilson did not apply his concept of self determination outside of Europe, it was after 1945 extended to Africa and Asia as his political thought, always flexible and pragmatic, evolved to meet new realities.
Len Shurtleff
Erez Manela's The Wilsonian Movement
The Wilsonian Moment: Self-Determination and the International Origins of Anticolonial Nationalism, Erez Manela, Oxford, 2009, 331 + xiv pages, notes, bibliography, photos, map, ISBN978 0 19 537853 5, $19.95 paperback. The author is an Associate Professor of History at Harvard University.
This elegantly drafted work tackles a seldom-examined facet of the post-World War one world: The impact of Woodrow Wilson’s widely broadcast declamations on post war peace settlements with particular regard to the consent of the governed. Much of the material covered in the introduction and first two chapters is familiar to students Wilson and the First World War. His Fourteen Points, his Four Principals and his July 4, 1918 speech at Mount Vernon are all well known and much studied. The next four chapters, however, cover far less familiar ground.
Here the author traces the impact of Wilson’s call for “self-determination” on four emerging polities: China, Korea, Egypt and India. In each of these counties, only one of which (China) was even nominally self-governing, Wilson’s words were seized upon as an opportunity to assert full independence from foreign occupiers breaking the bonds of imperial rule. National movements were strengthened by Wilson’s words and their adherents encouraged to seek full political sovereignty. Unfortunately, Wilson had no intention that his call for national sovereignty would extend much beyond Europe. Moreover, the other members of the “Big Four” – Great Britain, France and Italy – were still intent upon expanding their colonial empires. Thus, the Versailles Treaty of June 1918 actually made the world save for empire rather than freeing subject peoples in Africa, Arabia and Asia under the aegis of a League of Nations. Though many scholars then and since view Wilson and Lenin as competing for the hearts and minds of emerging nations, this was not necessarily the case. In 1918, the Bolshevik revolution had yet to seize control of Russia. More importantly, leaders like Gandhi, Sun Yat-sen, and Syngman Rhee at the time looked not to Lenin, but to Wilson -- the leading statesman of the day -- for inspiration.
Though the fires of nationalism were not kindled by Wilson, his words did stoke and continued to fuel passions even after it was clear in spring 1919 that no support among the victors of The Great War for any movement toward self determination of non-European peoples. The major powers at meeting at Paris to negotiate a peace treaty were unwilling to offer non-European peoples a place in the New World Order as tantalizing described by Wilson. After 1919, nationalists in China, Korea, Egypt and most particularly India took control of local politics and led their people away from cooperation and collaboration toward confrontation with their colonial masters until they were finally triumphant in the years following 1945 and another global conflagration.
Len Shurtleff
This elegantly drafted work tackles a seldom-examined facet of the post-World War one world: The impact of Woodrow Wilson’s widely broadcast declamations on post war peace settlements with particular regard to the consent of the governed. Much of the material covered in the introduction and first two chapters is familiar to students Wilson and the First World War. His Fourteen Points, his Four Principals and his July 4, 1918 speech at Mount Vernon are all well known and much studied. The next four chapters, however, cover far less familiar ground.
Here the author traces the impact of Wilson’s call for “self-determination” on four emerging polities: China, Korea, Egypt and India. In each of these counties, only one of which (China) was even nominally self-governing, Wilson’s words were seized upon as an opportunity to assert full independence from foreign occupiers breaking the bonds of imperial rule. National movements were strengthened by Wilson’s words and their adherents encouraged to seek full political sovereignty. Unfortunately, Wilson had no intention that his call for national sovereignty would extend much beyond Europe. Moreover, the other members of the “Big Four” – Great Britain, France and Italy – were still intent upon expanding their colonial empires. Thus, the Versailles Treaty of June 1918 actually made the world save for empire rather than freeing subject peoples in Africa, Arabia and Asia under the aegis of a League of Nations. Though many scholars then and since view Wilson and Lenin as competing for the hearts and minds of emerging nations, this was not necessarily the case. In 1918, the Bolshevik revolution had yet to seize control of Russia. More importantly, leaders like Gandhi, Sun Yat-sen, and Syngman Rhee at the time looked not to Lenin, but to Wilson -- the leading statesman of the day -- for inspiration.
Though the fires of nationalism were not kindled by Wilson, his words did stoke and continued to fuel passions even after it was clear in spring 1919 that no support among the victors of The Great War for any movement toward self determination of non-European peoples. The major powers at meeting at Paris to negotiate a peace treaty were unwilling to offer non-European peoples a place in the New World Order as tantalizing described by Wilson. After 1919, nationalists in China, Korea, Egypt and most particularly India took control of local politics and led their people away from cooperation and collaboration toward confrontation with their colonial masters until they were finally triumphant in the years following 1945 and another global conflagration.
Len Shurtleff
Roger Possner's The Rise of Militarism in the Progressive Era, 1900-1914
The Rise of Militarism in the Progressive Era, 1900-1914, Roger Possner, McFarlane, 2009, 252 pages, illustrations, index, notes, ISBN 978 0 7864 4418 2, $39.95 paperback.
To order, contact McFarlane Publishers at www.madfarlanepub.com or phone (800) 253-2187.
This is book about the rise of militarism in America during the height of the progressive era. The author starts out from the premise that Progressives were more interested in changing people than they were in changing society. In other words, they sought to spread manly middle class values including patriotism. In America, the years immediately prior to World War I were dominated politically by the Republican Party and progressives like Theodore Roosevelt. These years witnessed a shift in American attitudes toward social structure and duty as politicians pushed for a larger army and navy and their more frequent use.
Public interest in and support for a stronger military gained support as a result of the expanded American assertiveness in foreign affairs including the Spanish-American War of 1989, the Philippine Insurrection, the Mexican Revolution and the creation of an American colonial empire in the Pacific and Caribbean. Real and perceived threats from an expansionist Japan in Asia and Germany in Latin America fed militarism as did the popular press, three-fold expansion of the Army, enhanced military recruiting, military sponsorship of shooting competitions among other factors. The War Department also sponsored military education in schools, held military tournaments in major cities and encouraged public attendance at military maneuvers. In an age when adult males participated by the thousands in civic and fraternal organizations, the National Guard reorganized under the Dick Act of 1903 and naval militia offered opportunities for both patriotic service and fellowship.
Though counter currents of mass immigration, pacifism, socialism and unionism hostile to military expansion are not ignored, the author sees these as being submerged in a wider progressive trend toward favorable to an expanded military role in American society and political affairs in the first 15 years of the 20th century.
Len Shurtleff
To order, contact McFarlane Publishers at www.madfarlanepub.com or phone (800) 253-2187.
This is book about the rise of militarism in America during the height of the progressive era. The author starts out from the premise that Progressives were more interested in changing people than they were in changing society. In other words, they sought to spread manly middle class values including patriotism. In America, the years immediately prior to World War I were dominated politically by the Republican Party and progressives like Theodore Roosevelt. These years witnessed a shift in American attitudes toward social structure and duty as politicians pushed for a larger army and navy and their more frequent use.
Public interest in and support for a stronger military gained support as a result of the expanded American assertiveness in foreign affairs including the Spanish-American War of 1989, the Philippine Insurrection, the Mexican Revolution and the creation of an American colonial empire in the Pacific and Caribbean. Real and perceived threats from an expansionist Japan in Asia and Germany in Latin America fed militarism as did the popular press, three-fold expansion of the Army, enhanced military recruiting, military sponsorship of shooting competitions among other factors. The War Department also sponsored military education in schools, held military tournaments in major cities and encouraged public attendance at military maneuvers. In an age when adult males participated by the thousands in civic and fraternal organizations, the National Guard reorganized under the Dick Act of 1903 and naval militia offered opportunities for both patriotic service and fellowship.
Though counter currents of mass immigration, pacifism, socialism and unionism hostile to military expansion are not ignored, the author sees these as being submerged in a wider progressive trend toward favorable to an expanded military role in American society and political affairs in the first 15 years of the 20th century.
Len Shurtleff
Trench Art, by Jane Kimball
Trench Art: An Illustrated History, Jane A. Kimball, Silverpenny Press, 2004, 401 + xi pages, index, bibliography, color and halftone photos, ISBN 097559 710 8, $65.00 from Barnes & Nobel.
This large, coffee table-size and profusely illustrated book traces the history of soldiers’ art from its origins among prisoners of war during the American Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars through its World War One “golden age” as a soldiers’ cottage industry to the early 21st century. Much of the book deals with art produced by French and British soldiers from recycled Western Front battlefield detritus and the post-war commercial manufacture of souvenirs for battlefield tourists, which continues today.
There are also chapters on decorated shell casings, other types of trench art including tankards, bowls, musical instruments, jewelry, and even clocks. Such art was also produced by WWI POWs seeking cash for comforts, as well as by refugees and exiles in the 19th and 20th centuries. The author also offers a useful primer on collecting, caring for and cataloging trench art, and how to spot fakes.
The high quality color photos make this book worth the purchase price.
Len Shurtleff
This large, coffee table-size and profusely illustrated book traces the history of soldiers’ art from its origins among prisoners of war during the American Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars through its World War One “golden age” as a soldiers’ cottage industry to the early 21st century. Much of the book deals with art produced by French and British soldiers from recycled Western Front battlefield detritus and the post-war commercial manufacture of souvenirs for battlefield tourists, which continues today.
There are also chapters on decorated shell casings, other types of trench art including tankards, bowls, musical instruments, jewelry, and even clocks. Such art was also produced by WWI POWs seeking cash for comforts, as well as by refugees and exiles in the 19th and 20th centuries. The author also offers a useful primer on collecting, caring for and cataloging trench art, and how to spot fakes.
The high quality color photos make this book worth the purchase price.
Len Shurtleff
A Soldier of the Great War, by Mark Helprin
This too lengthy novel contains some of the richest writing you will ever encounter on any subject. Mark Helprin is a master of language and human interaction. This thrice-too long novel should have been the "All Quiet on the Italian Front" but misses by about 30%. However, I recommend you borrow this novel and read the sections on climbing the Italian/Austrian border mountains, small unit fighting during WW1 in these same mountains, Italian small unit fighting around the Isonzo River during WW1 and, most uniquely, chasing deserters in the mountains of Sicily. For the most part, this novel is a picaresque voyage of discovery of a middle class Italian academic forced reluctantly into various military formations during WW1 to become an accidental but bona fide hero. Two thirds of the novel cover our hero's far less interesting years outside WW1. Some of the battles and eccentric fellow soldiers and commanders encountered are uniquely described in luxurious detail you have never before read. If only Helprin had restricted this novel to 1/3 its length and concentrated only on the WW1 Italian battle, marching, prison camp and cantonement scenes, this novel would be a classic on the order of "All Quiet..." for the relatively unknown Italian front.
Jeff Milman,
Jeff Milman,
Liaquat Ahamed's Lords of Finance
Lords of finance: The Bankers Who Broke the World, Liaquat Ahamed, Penguin, 2009, 564 pages, photos, tables, index, ISBN 978 1 59240 182 0, $32.95 cloth.
This is largely the story of four titans of international finance dealing with the impact of World war One, 1919 Versailles settlement, and most particularly the reparations imposed on Germany by the victorious European powers. The four are Montague Norman, Governor of the Bank of England, Benjamin Strong, Governor of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York, Hjalmar Schacht, President of the Reichsbank, and Amié Moreau, Governor of the Bank of France. These are the four leading protagonists in efforts to reestablish a world financial system shattered by The Great War and hobbled by conflict over German reparations and Allied war debts. It is also the story of the Dawes and Young Plan devised in 1924 and 1929-30 to deal with reparations and other war debt payments issues, as well as the economic upheavals of the 1920: the reimposition of the gold standard; the great German currency inflation; and, the American stock market bubble.
The author makes several sustainable and a couple of less certain findings.
First, he accuses the Weimar Republic of having followed deliberately inflationary policies in an effort to mitigate the impact of reparations, a finding not supported by many other economic historians. And, he asserts that Great Britain (along with Germany, France and Russia) abandoned the gold standard in 1914*. In fact, England did not formally abandon gold until 1919 and throughout the war made a monumental and largely successful effort to sustain sterling parity with the dollar and protect England position as the world’s banker.
More to the point are the author’s judgments on the roots of the Great Depression of 1929-1933. Foremost among the culprits are the politicians who presided over the Paris peace conference of 1919 who left the world with a gigantic overhang of international debt. Germany began the 1920 by owing some $12 billion in reparations to France and Britain, while Britain and France owed seven billion dollars in war debts to America. None of these bills were ever paid. The second group to blame were the leading central bankers of the era (Norman, Strong, Schacht and Moreau) responsible for decisions to take the world back to the unsustainable gold standard. As a result, most of the world’s gold flowed to the United States while Germany was able to accrue large foreign debts for largely unproductive pubic works improvements. When the German economy (the world’s third largest) collapsed in 1928, the stage was set for world-wide economic upheaval.
This is largely the story of four titans of international finance dealing with the impact of World war One, 1919 Versailles settlement, and most particularly the reparations imposed on Germany by the victorious European powers. The four are Montague Norman, Governor of the Bank of England, Benjamin Strong, Governor of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York, Hjalmar Schacht, President of the Reichsbank, and Amié Moreau, Governor of the Bank of France. These are the four leading protagonists in efforts to reestablish a world financial system shattered by The Great War and hobbled by conflict over German reparations and Allied war debts. It is also the story of the Dawes and Young Plan devised in 1924 and 1929-30 to deal with reparations and other war debt payments issues, as well as the economic upheavals of the 1920: the reimposition of the gold standard; the great German currency inflation; and, the American stock market bubble.
The author makes several sustainable and a couple of less certain findings.
First, he accuses the Weimar Republic of having followed deliberately inflationary policies in an effort to mitigate the impact of reparations, a finding not supported by many other economic historians. And, he asserts that Great Britain (along with Germany, France and Russia) abandoned the gold standard in 1914*. In fact, England did not formally abandon gold until 1919 and throughout the war made a monumental and largely successful effort to sustain sterling parity with the dollar and protect England position as the world’s banker.
More to the point are the author’s judgments on the roots of the Great Depression of 1929-1933. Foremost among the culprits are the politicians who presided over the Paris peace conference of 1919 who left the world with a gigantic overhang of international debt. Germany began the 1920 by owing some $12 billion in reparations to France and Britain, while Britain and France owed seven billion dollars in war debts to America. None of these bills were ever paid. The second group to blame were the leading central bankers of the era (Norman, Strong, Schacht and Moreau) responsible for decisions to take the world back to the unsustainable gold standard. As a result, most of the world’s gold flowed to the United States while Germany was able to accrue large foreign debts for largely unproductive pubic works improvements. When the German economy (the world’s third largest) collapsed in 1928, the stage was set for world-wide economic upheaval.
*The Currency and Bank Note Act of 1914 removed gold from general circulation and allowed the Bank of England to issue legal one pound and 10 schilling bank notes without regard to gold reserve rules.
Len Shurtleff
March 2009
Len Shurtleff
March 2009
Eileen Welsome's The General and the Jaguar
The General and the Jaguar: Pershing’s Hunt for Pancho Villa, Eileen Welsome, Bison Books (University of Nebraska Press), 2007, 403 pages, photos, maps, notes, appendix, bibliography, index, ISBN 978-0 8032 2224 3, $21.95 trade paperback First published by Little Brown in 2007.
Angered Venustiano Carranza’s use of American railways to transfer troops across Texas, Pancho Villa retaliated with a raid on the dusty border town of Columbus, New Mexico. Villa’s raid on March 9, 1916, resulted in 18 dead and 26 wounded, including soldiers of the 13tth Cavalry whose barracks were located at Columbia. In retaliation, President Wilson -- under pressure from congressmen -- sent Brigadier General John J. Pershing with a force of over 5,000 men and 4,000 horses and mules into Mexico in pursuit of “The Jaguar” Villa. This force eventually grew to some 10,000 men and penetrated 500 miles into Chihuahua State without ever catching up with the elusive Villa. Denied the use of Mexican railways Pershing for the first time employed motor trucks as well mule-drawn wagons to supply his force. He also engaged Signal Corps Jenny aircraft for reconnaissance.
At the time, Mexico was in the midst of a decade-long civil war. Having already intervened in Vera Cruz in 1914, Wilson reluctantly recognized the de facto regime of Venustiano Carranza. Germany, seeking to distract America from the war in Europe, backed ousted dictator Victoriano Huerta. At stake were large and important American and British investments in Mexican cattle, land and minerals, particularly oil. At the time, Mexico was the world’s second largest exporter of petroleum after the United States. The Royal Navy depended on Mexico for much of its fuel oil.
Before withdrawing in March 1917, Pershing clashed with Carranza’s federal troops as well as with Villa partisans and war nearly broke out between the two neighbors. Wilson and his cabinet believed that Mexicans would welcome Pershing’s soldiers. They were wrong. As a result, El Paso was put on a war footing and Wilson federalized thousands of National Guardsmen to patrol the border until they were reorganized for European service.*
Despite his lack of success, the punitive expedition catapulted Pershing into national prominence. He was promoted Major General and given command of American Expeditionary Forces when American declared war on Germany in April 1917.
Villa continued to raid and hide out in rural Chihuahua until he negotiated an amnesty in 1923. He was assassinated in 1928.
Len Shurtleff
January 2009
*This was not the final time that American forces intervened in Mexico. See Wings and Saddles: The Air and Cavalry Punitive Expedition of 1919, Stacy C. Hinkle, Southwestern Studies, Monograph No.19, The University of Texas at El Paso, Volume V, No.3, 1967.
Angered Venustiano Carranza’s use of American railways to transfer troops across Texas, Pancho Villa retaliated with a raid on the dusty border town of Columbus, New Mexico. Villa’s raid on March 9, 1916, resulted in 18 dead and 26 wounded, including soldiers of the 13tth Cavalry whose barracks were located at Columbia. In retaliation, President Wilson -- under pressure from congressmen -- sent Brigadier General John J. Pershing with a force of over 5,000 men and 4,000 horses and mules into Mexico in pursuit of “The Jaguar” Villa. This force eventually grew to some 10,000 men and penetrated 500 miles into Chihuahua State without ever catching up with the elusive Villa. Denied the use of Mexican railways Pershing for the first time employed motor trucks as well mule-drawn wagons to supply his force. He also engaged Signal Corps Jenny aircraft for reconnaissance.
At the time, Mexico was in the midst of a decade-long civil war. Having already intervened in Vera Cruz in 1914, Wilson reluctantly recognized the de facto regime of Venustiano Carranza. Germany, seeking to distract America from the war in Europe, backed ousted dictator Victoriano Huerta. At stake were large and important American and British investments in Mexican cattle, land and minerals, particularly oil. At the time, Mexico was the world’s second largest exporter of petroleum after the United States. The Royal Navy depended on Mexico for much of its fuel oil.
Before withdrawing in March 1917, Pershing clashed with Carranza’s federal troops as well as with Villa partisans and war nearly broke out between the two neighbors. Wilson and his cabinet believed that Mexicans would welcome Pershing’s soldiers. They were wrong. As a result, El Paso was put on a war footing and Wilson federalized thousands of National Guardsmen to patrol the border until they were reorganized for European service.*
Despite his lack of success, the punitive expedition catapulted Pershing into national prominence. He was promoted Major General and given command of American Expeditionary Forces when American declared war on Germany in April 1917.
Villa continued to raid and hide out in rural Chihuahua until he negotiated an amnesty in 1923. He was assassinated in 1928.
Len Shurtleff
January 2009
*This was not the final time that American forces intervened in Mexico. See Wings and Saddles: The Air and Cavalry Punitive Expedition of 1919, Stacy C. Hinkle, Southwestern Studies, Monograph No.19, The University of Texas at El Paso, Volume V, No.3, 1967.
M. Sukru Hanioglu's A Brief History of the Late Ottoman Empire
A Brief History of the Late Ottoman Empire, M. Şűkrű Hanioğlu, Princeton, 2008, 241 + xii pages, photos, maps, index, bibliography, ISBN 978 0 69`1 13452 9, $29.95 cloth. The author is a professor of Near Eastern Studies at Princeton.
Dr. Hanioğlu presents a long overdue analysis of the last century of the Ottoman Empire from 1787 through the advent of the Young Turks with greatest emphasis on the period from 1870 to 1918. Flying in the face of historical convention he asserts that Sublime Porte in the post-French Revolutionary period made sustained efforts to modernize and rationalize both its internal governance and its foreign policy striving to become a modern power and a member of the Concert of Europe. Both the 19th century Young Ottoman and the better-known 20th century army-cased Young Turk reform movements were dedicated first and foremost to preserving the Ottoman Empire and only secondarily to reforming political administration. In this they were faced with almost insurmountable odds. Periodic revolts and wars combined with rising nationalism among Ottoman minorities (Kurds, Albanians, Serbs Arabs, Greeks, Armenians), Russian and Austro-Hungarian designs on Ottoman satrapies in the Balkans, Italian and British incursions against Ottoman possessions in Africa and Arabia, economic domination by richer European powers, as well as weak political and administrative structures. Given these handicaps, it is a wonder that the Empire held together as long and as well as it did.
Of particular interest to historians of World War I will be Professor Hanioğlu’s analysis of Ottoman diplomacy. In the 19th century, the Ottoman’s sought and gained British protection against Russian ambitions to dominate the strategic straits leading from the Black to the Mediterranean Sea. By the end of the century, however, the Sublime Porte came into conflict with British determination control Ottoman Egypt and access to the Suez Canal. Austro-Hungarian incursions into the Balkans, Italian occupation of Libya, and the Balkan War of 1912 further weakened the Empire. After vainly seeking alliances with France and England as the European pot boiled over 1n 1914, the Young Turks finally seized the life preserver thrown by Germany opening herself to final dismemberment by the Entente victors in the post war settlements.
In all, this is a fine effort well worth reading for its valuable background WWI, to the politics of modern Turkey and of the other Ottoman successor states. Its maps are particularly useful, but the book could use a glossary of Ottoman terms unfamiliar to western readers. Having said that, I hasten to add that definition of these unfamiliar terms are available from online Turkish-English dictionaries.
Len Shurtleff
Of particular interest to historians of World War I will be Professor Hanioğlu’s analysis of Ottoman diplomacy. In the 19th century, the Ottoman’s sought and gained British protection against Russian ambitions to dominate the strategic straits leading from the Black to the Mediterranean Sea. By the end of the century, however, the Sublime Porte came into conflict with British determination control Ottoman Egypt and access to the Suez Canal. Austro-Hungarian incursions into the Balkans, Italian occupation of Libya, and the Balkan War of 1912 further weakened the Empire. After vainly seeking alliances with France and England as the European pot boiled over 1n 1914, the Young Turks finally seized the life preserver thrown by Germany opening herself to final dismemberment by the Entente victors in the post war settlements.
In all, this is a fine effort well worth reading for its valuable background WWI, to the politics of modern Turkey and of the other Ottoman successor states. Its maps are particularly useful, but the book could use a glossary of Ottoman terms unfamiliar to western readers. Having said that, I hasten to add that definition of these unfamiliar terms are available from online Turkish-English dictionaries.
Len Shurtleff
Terence Zuber's The Battle of the Frontiers
The Battle of the Frontiers, Ardennes 1914, Terence Zuber, Tempus, 2007, 314 pages, maps, photos, schematic sketches, orders of battle, end notes, glossary, ISBN 978 0 7524 4424 6, $34.96 cloth. Dr. Zuber is a retired US Major and the author of Inventing the Schlieffen Plan: German War Planning 1871-1914 (Oxford 2002) and German War Planning 1891-1914: Sources and Interpretations (Boydell & Brewer, 2004).
The is a first-class and long over-due study of the opening battles of World War I on the Western Front and the armies that fought them. It is also the first book in English on the Battle of the Frontiers fought in the Ardennes. Perhaps the most valuable part of this analysis is contained in the first two chapters in which Dr. Zuber examines the very different doctrine and training methods used by Germany and France. Not surprisingly, he finds Germany doctrine, tactical training and staff leadership vastly superior to the often slap-dash French system. Specifically, the Battle of the Frontiers proved the superiority of German battle tactics and front-line leadership, as well as superior understanding of the importance of reconnaissance despite the frequent breakdowns of command and control at the divisional and corps level. The Germans emphasized patrols at all tactical levels and in all arms. While the French focused on maneuver, the Germans sought battlefield superiority through movement and firepower, including the use of artillery. And, the Germans with their powerful, high angle-of-fire howitzer had artillery superiority. Unlike the rigid French Army system of detailed written orders, Germany stressed flexibility and initiative among company and platoon commanders, and even NCOs. These habits of command were reinforced by frequent peace-time field exercises at all levels of command. By comparison, French pre-war training regimes were uneven and irregular.
Moreover, the Battle of the Frontiers did not prove the efficacy of either the German or French battle plans. Since pre-war plans were not executed by either side, victory was the result of small unit successes based on superior German tactics and training. Also, the author contends, French defeat in the first battles of 1914 could not be laid at the feet of Grandmaison and his theories of offense á outrance which were adopted too late to influence French 1914 tactics.
This book is thankfully full of those clear, useful maps often missing from military histories. The author made great use of German primary sources, including war diaries, as well as more limited and often fragmentary French sources. By 1914, as the author asserts, the German Army had reached the pinnacle having learned to fight outnumbered and win even in the difficult terrain of the Ardennes. Therefore, it is fitting that this monograph concentrates on its operations.
Len Shurtleff
Lewis Gould's Four Hats in the Ring
Four Hats in the Ring: the 1912 Election and the Birth of Modern American Politics, Lewis L. Gould, Kansas, 2008, 235 + xvii pages, photos, drawings, index, bibliography, appendices, notes, ISBN 978 0 7006 1564 3, $29.95 cloth. A History Book Club selection.
The last American presidential election before The Great War was the first of our modern elections which set the pattern for two-party competition between Republicans and Democrats for the rest of the century. Four candidates, all well qualified, debated matters of real substance: social security, the tariff and free trade, and the regulation of big business and banking to name a few. It was also the first election to feature a year-long campaign complete with presidential primaries and with the protagonists crisscrossing the country seeking votes. The Democratic candidate, Woodrow Wilson won with a 42% plurality by holding the party base in the Midwest and South, while former President Theodore Roosevelt and incumbent Republican William Howard Taft split the majority Republican vote assuring a Wilson win. Roosevelt came in second in both the popular and electoral college votes, the only third party candidate to do so in American electoral history. Railroad unionist Eugene Debs, the Socialist standard bearer, polled nearly a million votes, a Socialist high water mark despite a lack-luster campaign.
While Wilson and Roosevelt were both progressives in their approach to governance and reform, Wilson was a traditional Democrat Jeffersonian who favored small business and small government, ironic in view of his leadership in creating a vastly expanded Washington bureaucracy to meet the demands of World War One. Roosevelt, on the other hand, believed in the power of big government to mandate social and economic reform. It is another irony that Wilson had adopted most of the planks of Roosevelt’s 1912 “Bull Moose” Progressive Party platform in legislation passed during his firm term.
Len Shurtleff
Marilene Henry and Peter Lang's A Zouave's Journey
A Zouave’s Journey: Recollections of a Footsoldier of the 37th African Division, Marilène Patten Henry, Peter Lang, 2007 142 + xii pages, maps, bibliography, index, ISBN 798 0 8204 9708 2, $61.95 hardback.
The poignant story of a fatherless orphan, Archille Lecreux, conscripted into the French army in May 1917 as a youth of 19 years who spent 30 months as an infantry men, was wounded, gassed, received the Croix de Guerre and rose to the rank of corporal. The story is drawn largely from his own writings. His diary – he was among the first generation to benefit from the universal primary education mandated by the Third Republic – offers much insight into the life of a front line soldier of The Great War: the comradeship, the poor food, mud, long marches; long periods of boredom interspersed with hours of terror and the death of friends.
In recounting this story, the author gives us much useful information about the life in the French Army, in particular about its elite Zouave regiments from North Africa which first won fame in the Crimea and Mexico. The Zouave are familiar to Americans as their unique uniforms comprising baggy red trousers, a wide blue sash, and close fitting vest topped off with a fez were popular among militia regiments of our own Civil War. Lecreux’s story is also illustrative of the careless fashion in which the French government treated war veterans and about the corrosive effect of the war on French society in general amid often severe postwar social and economic dislocation. His was not a happy, fulfilling life. Unable to work after the war, Lecreux received a pittance in disability pension from the government, but no useful treatment for the lingering affects his physical and psychological wounds. He died in 1988 at the age of 92 isolated from friends and family by his Great War memories.
Len Shurtleff
Frederick Dickinson's War and National Renovation
War and National Renovation: Japan in the Great War, 1914-1919, Frederick R. Dickinson, Harvard, 1999, 363 + xviii pages, illustrations, index, bibliography, ISBN 0 674 00507 4.
This is a scholarly study of domestic politics and the diplomatic relations of Japan during the WWI period. Japan, it may be necessary to emphasize, had been allied to Great Britain since 1902 and was a member of the “Big Five” powers (America, Britain, France, Italy and Japan) at the 1919 Paris peace negotiations. Still, Japan’s involvement in the conflict was limited. It conquered and occupied the German Kiaochow leasehold and took over many German South Pacific island possessions in 1914. Her major war aims revolved around protecting and expanding her economic penetration of Manchuria and China, and retaining occupied German territories. Though Japan was basically untouched by The Great War, she was emboldened by this, her third in a series of victorious conflicts beginning in 1894-95 with China and continuing with Russia (1904-05).
At the same time, Japan was undergoing severe domestic political stress with the end of the Meiji Era, and the Tishaō political crisis of 1912. Domestic political forces included fledgling political parties, newly created labor federations, powerful conservative army and civilian bureaucrats. Many party leaders favored the extension of the franchise and evolution of a British-style parliamentary democracy; conservative supported sustaining the Meiji constitutional monarchy based on the German pattern. The conflict between these opposing forces was not resolved, but rather intensified during the conflict and disagreements over how to cope with the Chinese Revolution and ensuing endemic political instability there.
These domestic conflicts spilled over into the diplomatic arena. Conservatives wanted to expand Japanese influence in China beyond economic and financial matters to political and military domination. In many respects, conservative imperialists envisioned Japan as playing in Asia the same role that American played in the Western Hemisphere. And, they feared American efforts to maintain an “open door” in China, as well as Wilson’s powerful insistence on democratic governance and collective security as represented by the League of Nations. Seeing their ambitions in Asia, particularly in China and Manchuria, thwarted by Wilson, Japan began to look upon the United States, its ally Great Britain, as future enemies.
Len Shurtleff
William Silber's When Washington Shut Down Wall Street
When Washington Shut Down Wall Street: the Great Financial Crisis of 1914 and the Origins of America’s Monetary Supremacy, William L. Silber, Princeton, 2007217 + xi pages, photos, graphs, index, notes, references, ISBN 0 691 12747 6, $27.95 cloth.
The author is Nadler Professor of Finance and Economics at the Stern School of Business at NYU.
The author is Nadler Professor of Finance and Economics at the Stern School of Business at NYU.
Woodrow Wilson’s son-in-law and Treasury Secretary William Gibbs McAdoo is the hero of this neglected chapter of American history. McAdoo almost single handedly prevented a massive flow of gold overseas, kept America on the gold standard and prevented a disastrous run on banks by panicked depositors in the wake of the outbreak of war in Europe in the summer of 1914. McAdoo acted to preserve international confidence in the US monetary system which was badly eroded in the wake of the panic of 1907. He had none of the tools available to modern statesmen. The establishment of the newly- created Federal Reserve System, our central bank, was being delayed by political squabbling following its authorization in late 1913. While he worked to create the Federal Reserve of which he was the first Chairman, McAdoo took bold action to close the New York Stock Exchange preventing overseas investors from selling their shares and demanding payment in gold for export. He kept the Exchange closed for four months while he moved to preserve liquidity and prevent a run on the banks by issuing more paper currency. These decisive moves not only kept American on the gold standard, but also preserved domestic and international confidence in the American financial system, and set the stage for massive American sales to the embattled Entente, as well as for the emergence of Wall Street as the world financial capital eclipsing the City of London.
This book is a useful primer on the world of international finance in the early 20th century and on how World War I was financed. It is jargon-free and presented in lively prose.
Len Shurtleff
Robert Koenig's The Fourth Horseman
The story of the son of an American Civil War winner of the Medal of Honor who attempts to infect with ganders and anthrax horses and mules being shipped to the Entente from the US. Anton Dilger was born in Virginia, but returned to Germany, his father and mother’s homeland, at age ten, attended Heidelberg University and became a surgeon in 1911. He served as a volunteer surgeon in Bulgaria during the Balkan Wars of 1912-13 and in Germany at the outset of The Great War. In late 1915, he returned to America via Holland to embark on a career in germ warfare as an agent of German intelligence. His assignment was part of a wider German effort (also detailed by the author) to curtail American supply of munitions and other goods to the Entente by sabotaging munitions plants and merchant vessels, poisoning draught animals and fomenting labor undress among dock workers.
This book reminds us that World War I was a conflict of animal traction. Even Detroit could not meet the demand for motor trucks and both sides were chronically short of the millions of horses and mules vital to supplying their fighting forces. In all, some 750 thousand horses and mules were shipped from America to Europe during the course of the conflict.
We are also reminded that persons of German descent were the largest single ethnic group in America of the 1910s. Like the Irish (the second largest aggregation of hyphenated Americans), many German-Americans were opposed to American entry into the war on the side of Britain and France. Dilger worked from a laboratory in his basement in Chevy Chase, a Washington, D.C. suburb, not far from the British Army’s principal remount depot at Newport News, Virginia in collaboration with family members, Imperial German military attachés and diplomats, interned German seamen and German-born Americans. Later Dilger became involved in abortive German attempts to foment a border war between Mexico and the US. His cover blown, he, ironically, died in 1918 in Spain from the effects of influenza. .
Len Shurtleff
Liulevicius' War Land on the Eastern Front
Vejas Gabriel Liulevicius. War Land on the Eastern Front: Culture, National Identity, and German Occupation in World War I. Studies in the Social and Cultural History of Modern Warfare. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000. viii + 309 pp. Maps, notes, bibliography, index. $59.95 (cloth), ISBN 978-0-521-66157-7.
Reviewed by: Peter Fritzsche , Department of History, University of Illinois.
Published by: H-German (March, 2001)
Vejas Gabriel Liulevicius' new book on cultural and military politics on the eastern front in World War I makes plain how much has been lost in the historiographical fixation on the western front. The everyday brutalization in the trenches, the formation of a separate generational identity, the introduction of new and fierce technologies, and the fantastic military effort to achieve a breakthrough are crucial foundations for understanding the postwar period, the drama of defeat and humiliation, and the emergence of new, more populist politics in Germany as well as in France and Britain. Liulevicius has another story to tell, one equally important and, in this case, one told with great authority, catching detail, and clarifying insight. Although only one-third of German troop strength was arrayed against Russia, the experiences of the soldiers and the efforts of the military administration had lasting consequences, creating what Liulevicius' appropriately refers to as "the mindscape of the East." What had been encountered first as a "complicated weaving of 'lands and peoples'" (Land und Leute) was increasingly regarded as a vast, manipulable terrain of "'spaces and races' (Raum und Volk) to be orderd by German mastery and organization" (p. 8). While the harsh German occupiers of 1914-1918 differed fundamentally from the racial masters of 1939-1945, the experience of World War I furnished many of the tools, the lessons, and the perceptions on which the policies of World War II rested. One of the great strengths of Liulevicius' argument is that it draws out the implications of a superb case study of one area of German wartime occupation in Kurland and Lithuania (Ober-Ost) to encompass the Freikorps, the Weimar Republic, and the Nazi period. Among Liulevicius' most effective vignettes are the train trips that soldiers, officers, and administrators take across the eastern battlelines. These fast-moving, impressionable journeys invited Germans to play the role of amateur ethnographer. They were fascinated by what they saw, commenting endlessly on allegedly more primitive agricultural practices, and making summary distinctions between primitive East and cultured West. These train journeys symbolized the detached but powerful and mobile roles that Germans had acquired as conquerers. And they helped create a powerful "Orientalizing" aesthetic of the East, which subsequently guided action and policy. Liulevicius is at his best in his discussions of this aesthetic or mindscape. Sweeping through the cities, the newcomers saw a "riot of architectural simultaneity," with "styles densely topping one another" (38). In the countryside, they noted how "field and meadow, tree and bush are left to themselves" without the "planned order" that prevalied in Germany (70). Cutting a trench through the sandy soil of the war zone, soldiers were shocked to find the bones and artifacts of prehistoric societies, a distant past that was shockingly close to the surface. "This unfamiliar mess of history" was a sign of the primitive, an invitation for Germans to cultivate. Ober Ost thus became the site of intensive German cultural colonization. German work and German culture was to transform the occupied territories into recognizable, civilized places. Germany's colonial mission therefore rested on the confusing presence of Land und Leute, whom the Germans would take in hand. Under Ludendorff, Ober Ost was intended to be a place of far-reaching agricultural extraction, and the territories were surveyed and administered in the most efficient ways imaginable. Nonetheless, an identifiable, if totally patronizing German cultural mission remained in place; there were even amicable relations between Eastern European Jews and German occupiers (something Liulevicius might have expanded on), and unlikely figures such as Victor Klemperer found a role in the administration to further these. The huge expectations that Ludendorff and his growing staff of experts and academics had for this miniature empire became clear in the administrative ambition of what Liulevicius calls "Verkehrspolitik," a kind of totalizing managerial politics. The land was closed off and then "divided up, creating a grid of control in which military authorities could direct every movement: of troops, requisitioned products, raw materials . . . manpower" (89). This effort at total exploitation totally failed, but both the effort and the failure led to a transformation of Land und Leute into Raum und Volk. It becomes clear in Liulevicius' argument that an ethnographic vision slowly gave way to a cultivating discourse, so that the complicated intertwining of ethnicity and religion disappeared into the exclusve terms of foreign native and German expert. The riot of the land was soon revisualized into vast, even oppressive spaces. And whereas supposedly culturally backward people still had a particular, even cherishable identity, manpower, lice-carriers, resources, and space did not. Any kind of effective occupation was further undermined by the mobilization of ethnic resistance to German rule. More and more train trips were made into a "fleeing vastness," a "wild nature" of "terrible ferocity" (pp. 152-53). This is exactly what the Freikorps saw; Bolshevism was, of course, the archetypical apparition on this landscape. In the end, writes Liulevicius, "the East appeared as an area of races and spaces, which could not be manipulated, but could only be cleared and cleaned." In reaching these well-argued conclusions, Liulevicius might have considered the general quandries of modern management, which recognizes the extreme malleability of social material and technological designs, and responds to this risk with more far-fetched intervention. To what extent did German practice and perception make Ober Ost a distinctly modern place, which authorized increasingly strenuous techniques of knowledge and practices of administration? A broader connection to the literature on German modernity would have been useful. The process that the war had begun, speeded up during the Weimar Republic. In the newly activated fields of Ostforschung and political geography, the East was "emptied of historical content;" "Raum was triumphantly ahistorical, biological, and 'scientific.'" Although administrators in Ober Ost, unlike Nazi conquerers, maintained a cultural politics and never quite gave up on the educative aims implicit in determinations of backwardness, Liulevicius underscores the lines of continuity between the two world wars: "the vicious outlook of the Nazis as they surveyed the East, seeing their own future in its conquest, was built upon a prior experience in the First World War and the lessons it seemed to yield" (p. 272). It is the experience and the encounter that Liulevicus emphasizes, and he thoroughly makes his argument that "War Land on the Eastern Front" needs to be understood as a critical place in Germany's twentieth-century history. Published by: H-German (March, 2001)
John E. MacNintch's The Brother Keepers
John E. MacNintch is a member of our site and author of The Brother Keepers: The Great War Odyssey of Sable MacInnes and his Brothers, a critically-acclaimed, creative non fiction Michener-type historical novel of snipers and bagpipers in the CEF. Historians convey what happened in the Great War; novelists who research history convey not only what happened, but also how the men must have felt and what they must have thought when they experienced those horrible wars of egregious human attrition under unspeakable conditions. The work represents ten years of research and writing about what the Canucks , and expatriated Americans ,experienced in World War I including accurate World War I historical aspects of battles fought and the mental anguish over breaking God's Commandment, Thou Shalt not Kill.
Review. This is a massive novel reminiscent of those produced by James Michener. The author, through the eyes of Sable MacInnes, one of five brothers, sons of an itinerant Baptist preacher, reveals in detail the course of Canadian participation in World War One. The first ten chapters of the book are devoted to the family life of the brothers as they grow up in rural Nova Scotia and to the culture of the Maritime Provinces. The remainder trace Canada's entry into The Great War and the campaigns of the Canadian Corps on the Western Front. MacNintch's fictional brothers are involved in one way or another in all of the major actions of the Canadian Corps: Ypres, the Somme, Passchendaele and the final push to Mons. One brother, who joins the navy, is present at Halifax when the French ammunition ship Mont Blanc explodes there in 1917, leveling half the city. All of this narrative is supported by excellent maps and historically accurate descriptions of the battles, as well as of Canadian politics of the times based on careful research extending from unit histories to family papers, and a thorough study of the literature and history of the conflict. There are excellent sketches of life in the trenches, relations between Canadians and their allies, as well as the weapons (including the Ross rifle) Canadians fought with. Appendices cover the Canadian Corps (CEF) order of battle in 1917 and contain a detailed glossary of contemporary military slang and terms used in the CEF. Authenticity is enhanced by quotations - set off in italics - from contemporary documents and historical studies. As most historians of World War One know, the Canadian Corps of five divisions (one of them stationed in England to train replacements) was as large as any of the five British armies on the Western Front and had a compliment of artillery larger than most armies. After mid-1917, it was totally under Canadian command with Lt. General (later Sir Arthur) Currie heading up an experienced, stable and expert staff, many of whom went on to lead the Canadian Army in WWII. The Canadian Corps has been described by several historians as the "shock troops" of the British Empire. Readers of this historical novel will discover why. The author's intent, clearly stated in his preface, is to place Canada's part in the Great War in proper context with that of the United States. In fact, however, Canada's role need not be compared with that of Woodrow Wilson's America. It stands on its own as a major contribution to Allied victory.
Len Shurtleff STAND TO! The Journal of the Western Front Association. Number 82: April/May 2008.
Review. This is a massive novel reminiscent of those produced by James Michener. The author, through the eyes of Sable MacInnes, one of five brothers, sons of an itinerant Baptist preacher, reveals in detail the course of Canadian participation in World War One. The first ten chapters of the book are devoted to the family life of the brothers as they grow up in rural Nova Scotia and to the culture of the Maritime Provinces. The remainder trace Canada's entry into The Great War and the campaigns of the Canadian Corps on the Western Front. MacNintch's fictional brothers are involved in one way or another in all of the major actions of the Canadian Corps: Ypres, the Somme, Passchendaele and the final push to Mons. One brother, who joins the navy, is present at Halifax when the French ammunition ship Mont Blanc explodes there in 1917, leveling half the city. All of this narrative is supported by excellent maps and historically accurate descriptions of the battles, as well as of Canadian politics of the times based on careful research extending from unit histories to family papers, and a thorough study of the literature and history of the conflict. There are excellent sketches of life in the trenches, relations between Canadians and their allies, as well as the weapons (including the Ross rifle) Canadians fought with. Appendices cover the Canadian Corps (CEF) order of battle in 1917 and contain a detailed glossary of contemporary military slang and terms used in the CEF. Authenticity is enhanced by quotations - set off in italics - from contemporary documents and historical studies. As most historians of World War One know, the Canadian Corps of five divisions (one of them stationed in England to train replacements) was as large as any of the five British armies on the Western Front and had a compliment of artillery larger than most armies. After mid-1917, it was totally under Canadian command with Lt. General (later Sir Arthur) Currie heading up an experienced, stable and expert staff, many of whom went on to lead the Canadian Army in WWII. The Canadian Corps has been described by several historians as the "shock troops" of the British Empire. Readers of this historical novel will discover why. The author's intent, clearly stated in his preface, is to place Canada's part in the Great War in proper context with that of the United States. In fact, however, Canada's role need not be compared with that of Woodrow Wilson's America. It stands on its own as a major contribution to Allied victory.
Len Shurtleff STAND TO! The Journal of the Western Front Association. Number 82: April/May 2008.
Autographed First Edition copies can be obtained from Aquadoc Publications LLC, 20 Pepperidge Trail, Old Saybrook CT 06475. (860-575-3829). ISBN 13: 978-9787505-0-3. Hard cover, 779 pages, 12 maps and 13 illustrations. $20.00 plus shipping and handling costs from CT address, by e-mail (j.macnintch@worldnet.att.net), or by PayPal from his book website www.thebrotherkeepers.com where excerpts, details, links and more reviews can be found. The book can also be ordered from Amazon.com.
Wayne Pettyjohn's Buck's Story
Bucks Story: A Marine in the Great War, Wayne A. Pettyjohn, illustrations Phyllis Pettyjohn, Dearing Printing & Trophy, Stillwater, OK, 200u8, 241 pages, maps, sketches, no ISBN, $20 paperback. Available from the author at (405) 372-1981 or e-mail wpettyj@aol.com.
This novel is based on stories the author heard from WWI veterans of the 4th Marine Brigade about their battles at Belleau Wood, the Second Battle of Soissons, at St. Mihiel, Blanc Mont and in the Meuse-Argonne. Descriptions of these battles are accompanied by useful maps.
This fast paced story traces the experiences of Michigan farm boy Buck Adams, who enlists in the Marines in May 1917 after graduating from high school. The reader follows Buck through boot camp at Paris Island, through infantry training at the newly-created Marine Base Quantico, and then overseas. Attached to the AEF’s Second Division, Buck’s unit – the 97th Company – was part of 3rd Battalion, 6th Marine Regiment, 4th Marine Brigade. Despite his youth, Buck is rapidly promoted to corporal, sergeant and then 2nd Lieutenant as he proves himself as a combat leader. His experiences in battle and behind the lines are crisply sketched and have the ring of verisimilitude without being maudlin or overdrawn. Characters are sketches are crisply but fully presented so that none come across as cardboard figures.
In all, a rollicking read based on real events.
Len Shurtleff
Robert Laplander's Finding the Lost Battalion
Finding the Lost Battalion: Beyond the Rumors, Myths and Legends of America’s Famous WWI Epic, Robert Laplander, Lulu.com, 2006, 616 pages, illustrations, maps,
ISBN 978 14116 76565, $35 paperback.
Amateur historian Robert Lapander has walked the ground where the Lost Battalion (actually parts of two battalions of the 77th Division) fought in the hills and ravines of the Argonne Forest in 1918. He asserts that he has corrected previous errors in positioning the location of the battle, which extended over several days. Mr. Laplander gave a powerful presentation of his findings at the April 2008 WFA East Coast Chapter seminar in Baltimore. His book in equally engaging and readable. It joins several other earlier histories of this event, which received wide publicity in the postwar era. One by established historians Thomas Johnson, Fletcher Pratt and Edward “Mac” Coffman is still in print. Another by Woodrow Wilson specialist Robert H. Ferrell is also still available.
Also available from Mr. Laplander’s American Expeditionary Foundation is The Lost Battalion: Return to the Charlevaux, 2007, 160 pages, ISBN 978 816151 39203, $27.50 paperback. This is a recounting of one of Mr. Laplander’s visits to the Lost Battalion site above Charlevaux Mill.
Len Shurtleff
Isabel Hull's Absolute Destruction
Gilli Vardi
Review of Isabel V. Hull, Absolute Destruction. Military Culture and the Practices of War in Imperial Germany
University of Sussex Journal of Contemporary History, 10, (2006)
Isabel V. Hull, Absolute Destruction. Military Culture and the Practices of War in
Imperial Germany, (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2004), 408 pages, ISBN
0801442583.
Hull’s book makes essential reading for scholars interested in two interlocking themes:
German military history of the early 20th century, and the question of continuity in
German modern history. Hull presents us with convincing and eloquent arguments, using
cultural theories as an analytical tool to explain the German conduct of war from 1870
through 1918. This is characterised with what Hull calls ‘institutional extremism’, the
doctrine and warfare of annihilation (Vernichtungskrieg) exercised in its extreme by the
Imperial Army in its African campaign of 1904 against the Herero insurrection, and
increasingly during the First World War. The German army, as Hull establishes, came to
develop a uniquely violent and genocidal military culture, unrestrained by the civil
authorities who were themselves taken by ‘double militarism’. This culture eventually
became unrealistic, dysfunctional and self destructive. Unfolding the story and role of
this military culture, the decisions taken by the German leadership, both military and
civil, the differences dissolving as the Great War continued, Hull makes a powerful
argument for German Sonderweg and raises an important contribution to Fritz Fischer’s
claim on the many links connecting the Kaiserreich with the Third Reich.
The book is divided into three parts. The first portrays the campaign in Southwest
Africa (now Namibia) between 1904 and 1907. In this campaign the army embarked on a
policy of exterminating the rebellious Herero. Ever since the wars of unification, the
German army came to define victory exclusively as the annihilation of the enemy’s
forces; this would be best achieved in a single, decisive battle of annihilation. In
accordance with this rationale, the extermination of the Herero people, not just the
warriors, became a ‘military necessity’, allowing the soldiers to expand the killing to
captives, women and children, and eventually to drive the Herero to the desert. Hull
estimates that 50-70 percent of them died as a result of the German campaign.
The second part of the book is the most interesting, original and thoughtprovoking.
Hull employs theories of culture and organisational culture to explain what
drove the German army, narrowed its frame of thought, determined how it conceptualised
warfare, and made some military solutions more desirable (and later the sole acceptable
answer) than others. In her cultural account, Hull’s analysis encompasses the civil
authorities and governments, the Reich’s constitution, laws and politics as well as the
army, since these were inseparable and affected each other’s development. In an
escalating process, Germany’s leaders subdued political guidance and primacy in setting
the goals of war to the military ones. The army itself inclined ever more toward extreme
warfare, and while other European armies with much the same inclinations were halted
by their governments, the German army was left (and even encouraged) to devote itself
completely to its cultural characteristics: risk taking, the endless pursuit of annihilation
battles, the reduction of strategy to meticulous operational and tactical planning, the trust
in fighting spirit and ‘qualitative superiority’, ruthlessness and an exaggerated drive for
action.
All these would prove fatal in the First World War, as Hull elaborates in the third
part of the book. In a gradual process the army alone came to define what ‘victory’ and
the ultimate goal of war is. This goal was reduced to a tactical formula (annihilation)
which turned means to ends, as the Schlieffen plan so clearly demonstrates. A realistic
assessment of Germany’s situation, resources, capabilities and needs, was not to be
found; nor was it demanded or appreciated, since the military leadership was
overwhelmingly confident that victory would be achieved should the army be granted
the freedom to conduct the war according to its demands and best decisions. This
freedom was granted, and the path was thus opened for the catastrophes that followed.
Once the Schlieffen plan failed to realize a decisive battle and the war turned into a slow,
total, all-consuming struggle, the military leaders stressed the exigencies of ‘military
necessity’, facilitating once again a ruthless and destructive occupation, this time in
Europe, while futilely trying again and again to wage that final decisive battle or create
the conditions that would lead to it. Eventually, driven to self-destructive extremity, they
were willing to accept Germany’s own destruction in a final last battle (Endkampf), and
preferred it over ‘humiliating’ surrender.
Hull’s argument, however powerful, is not without flaws. She ignores the
ideological component of warfare at the expense of the cultural one: Germany’s policy
was not devoid of ideological convictions as to Germany’s place under the sun, which
encouraged and propelled both its African campaign and its decisions during the July
1914 crisis. Ideology is a powerful motivator, indeed sometimes more powerful than
previous cultural constructs, and it can thus challenge the cultural explanations and
motivations presented so convincingly in the book. Hull addresses this issue only briefly
in her conclusions.A further discussion on public opinion and parliamentary objection to
the army’s demands prior to the First World War (mainly the SPD and its voters) could
have enriched the explanations of ‘double militarism’ and avoided a one-dimensional
analysis of the phenomenon.
However these questions do not undermine Hull’s achievement - shedding new
light and offering a comprehensive explanation to this complicated chapter in German
history. Hull presents us with a well-established explanation as to why and how Germany
was swept into the disasters of the Great War, and suggests interesting links between the
unification and colonial wars, and the World War that followed. It is a highly
recommended book and a valuable contribution to the research of German history.
Gilli Vardi
Department of International History
London School of Economics
Review of Isabel V. Hull, Absolute Destruction. Military Culture and the Practices of War in Imperial Germany
University of Sussex Journal of Contemporary History, 10, (2006)
Isabel V. Hull, Absolute Destruction. Military Culture and the Practices of War in
Imperial Germany, (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2004), 408 pages, ISBN
0801442583.
Hull’s book makes essential reading for scholars interested in two interlocking themes:
German military history of the early 20th century, and the question of continuity in
German modern history. Hull presents us with convincing and eloquent arguments, using
cultural theories as an analytical tool to explain the German conduct of war from 1870
through 1918. This is characterised with what Hull calls ‘institutional extremism’, the
doctrine and warfare of annihilation (Vernichtungskrieg) exercised in its extreme by the
Imperial Army in its African campaign of 1904 against the Herero insurrection, and
increasingly during the First World War. The German army, as Hull establishes, came to
develop a uniquely violent and genocidal military culture, unrestrained by the civil
authorities who were themselves taken by ‘double militarism’. This culture eventually
became unrealistic, dysfunctional and self destructive. Unfolding the story and role of
this military culture, the decisions taken by the German leadership, both military and
civil, the differences dissolving as the Great War continued, Hull makes a powerful
argument for German Sonderweg and raises an important contribution to Fritz Fischer’s
claim on the many links connecting the Kaiserreich with the Third Reich.
The book is divided into three parts. The first portrays the campaign in Southwest
Africa (now Namibia) between 1904 and 1907. In this campaign the army embarked on a
policy of exterminating the rebellious Herero. Ever since the wars of unification, the
German army came to define victory exclusively as the annihilation of the enemy’s
forces; this would be best achieved in a single, decisive battle of annihilation. In
accordance with this rationale, the extermination of the Herero people, not just the
warriors, became a ‘military necessity’, allowing the soldiers to expand the killing to
captives, women and children, and eventually to drive the Herero to the desert. Hull
estimates that 50-70 percent of them died as a result of the German campaign.
The second part of the book is the most interesting, original and thoughtprovoking.
Hull employs theories of culture and organisational culture to explain what
drove the German army, narrowed its frame of thought, determined how it conceptualised
warfare, and made some military solutions more desirable (and later the sole acceptable
answer) than others. In her cultural account, Hull’s analysis encompasses the civil
authorities and governments, the Reich’s constitution, laws and politics as well as the
army, since these were inseparable and affected each other’s development. In an
escalating process, Germany’s leaders subdued political guidance and primacy in setting
the goals of war to the military ones. The army itself inclined ever more toward extreme
warfare, and while other European armies with much the same inclinations were halted
by their governments, the German army was left (and even encouraged) to devote itself
completely to its cultural characteristics: risk taking, the endless pursuit of annihilation
battles, the reduction of strategy to meticulous operational and tactical planning, the trust
in fighting spirit and ‘qualitative superiority’, ruthlessness and an exaggerated drive for
action.
All these would prove fatal in the First World War, as Hull elaborates in the third
part of the book. In a gradual process the army alone came to define what ‘victory’ and
the ultimate goal of war is. This goal was reduced to a tactical formula (annihilation)
which turned means to ends, as the Schlieffen plan so clearly demonstrates. A realistic
assessment of Germany’s situation, resources, capabilities and needs, was not to be
found; nor was it demanded or appreciated, since the military leadership was
overwhelmingly confident that victory would be achieved should the army be granted
the freedom to conduct the war according to its demands and best decisions. This
freedom was granted, and the path was thus opened for the catastrophes that followed.
Once the Schlieffen plan failed to realize a decisive battle and the war turned into a slow,
total, all-consuming struggle, the military leaders stressed the exigencies of ‘military
necessity’, facilitating once again a ruthless and destructive occupation, this time in
Europe, while futilely trying again and again to wage that final decisive battle or create
the conditions that would lead to it. Eventually, driven to self-destructive extremity, they
were willing to accept Germany’s own destruction in a final last battle (Endkampf), and
preferred it over ‘humiliating’ surrender.
Hull’s argument, however powerful, is not without flaws. She ignores the
ideological component of warfare at the expense of the cultural one: Germany’s policy
was not devoid of ideological convictions as to Germany’s place under the sun, which
encouraged and propelled both its African campaign and its decisions during the July
1914 crisis. Ideology is a powerful motivator, indeed sometimes more powerful than
previous cultural constructs, and it can thus challenge the cultural explanations and
motivations presented so convincingly in the book. Hull addresses this issue only briefly
in her conclusions.A further discussion on public opinion and parliamentary objection to
the army’s demands prior to the First World War (mainly the SPD and its voters) could
have enriched the explanations of ‘double militarism’ and avoided a one-dimensional
analysis of the phenomenon.
However these questions do not undermine Hull’s achievement - shedding new
light and offering a comprehensive explanation to this complicated chapter in German
history. Hull presents us with a well-established explanation as to why and how Germany
was swept into the disasters of the Great War, and suggests interesting links between the
unification and colonial wars, and the World War that followed. It is a highly
recommended book and a valuable contribution to the research of German history.
Gilli Vardi
Department of International History
London School of Economics
Edward Lengel's To Conquer Hell
Edward G. Lengel, associate editor, the Papers of George Washington, "To Conquer Hell: The Meuse-Argonne, 1918." Henry Holt and Co.
March 14, 2008 — Ed Lengel's book, "To Conquer Hell" covers the dramatic story of the bloodiest battle in American history: the epic fight for the Meuse-Argonne in World War I.
On Sept. 26, 1918, more than 1 million American soldiers prepared to assault the German-held Meuse-Argonne region of France. Their commander, U.S. Army Gen. John J. Pershing, believed in the superiority of American "guts" over barbed wire, machine guns, massed artillery and poison gas. In 36 hours, he said, the Doughboys would crack the German defenses and open the road to Berlin.
Six weeks later, after savage fighting across swamps, forests, towns and rugged hills, the battle finally ended with the signing of the armistice that concluded the First World War. The Meuse-Argonne had fallen, at the cost of more than 120,000 American casualties, including 26,000 dead. In the bloodiest battle the country had ever seen, an entire generation of young Americans had been transformed forever.
"To Conquer Hell" also is studded with portraits of remarkable soldiers like Pershing, Harry Truman, George Patton and Alvin York, and authoritative in presenting the big picture. It is military history of the first rank and, incredibly, the first in-depth account of this fascinating and important battle.
"The Meuse-Argonne was the most important American battle of the First World War, and the bloodiest battle in American military history," said Lengel. "My book is the first comprehensive history of the battle from the soldiers’ eye view."
As an editor with the Washington Papers, Lengel has spent most of the last 12 years immersed in the Revolutionary War. But family history (he is a cousin of Sgt. Alvin C. York, famously portrayed by Gary Cooper in the 1941 film "Sergeant York") and a lifelong interest in soldiers' literature inspired his fascination with the First World War.
"This war was the single most important event of modern times," Lengel said. "It influenced every imaginable aspect of politics and culture across the globe."
Martin Gilbert, author of "The First World War" and "The Somme," praised the book as "one of the most powerful war books that I have read." He wrote, "Those who fought on the Meuse-Argonne in 1918, and all Americans interested in their national heritage, are fortunate that Edward G. Lengel has written this deeply researched book — bringing the strategy, the commanders, the officers and men, the tactics, the horror and the heroism together in a moving, dramatic and intensely human account."
Lengel is the author of "This Glorious Struggle: George Washington's Revolutionary War Letters," also released this year, and "General George Washington: A Military Life."
To Conquer Hell: The Meuse Argonne, 1918, Edward G. Lengel, Henry Holt, 2008, 491 + xiv pages, photos, maps, index, notes, bibliography, ISBN 0 8050 7931 9, $32.95 cloth.
The author teaches at the University of Virginia and is scheduled to speak at the September 2008 Western Front Association annual national seminar at Carlisle, Pennsylvania.
This is a detailed and long-overdue examination of this most bloody battle, actually a six-week-long major campaign of World War One. There have been only two book-length studies of the Meuse-Argonne since 1985: Paul Braim’s The Test of Battle (Delaware 1987); and, Robert Ferrell’s America’s Deadliest Battle Braim’s work was long on detail and short on cogent analysis; Ferrell was long on analysis but short on tactical detail. Lengel’s work is full of both, based as it is on a thorough study of primary and secondary sources including first-person accounts and unit histories. (Kansas 2007).
Attacking across broken, hilly ground held by deeply entrenched German forces since 1914, the American First and Second Armies took over 120,000 casualties including 26,000 dead. Yet, this was a combined arms battle involving both tanks and aircraft in both the scouting and attack modes. It was also a hard learning experience on a steep curve for inexperienced American infantry leaders and artillerists, who learned their trade in a series of costly frontal attacks. Logistics, despite the careful planning George Marshall and other skilled operations officers, was also an issue. Massive traffic jams hampered the attack for days and led to French calls AEF commander Pershing’s removal. Indeed, problems of food and ammunition supply and evacuation of the wounded were not resolved until after a mid-campaign pause for rest and reorganization.
In all, you will find here many accounts of the participation of future American military leaders (MacArthur, Marshall, Patton), as well as details of the individual actions, units engaged and analysis of results. These accounts will be familiar to specialists, but new to general readers not familiar with the details of American participation in The Great War. And, here lies the value of this book: educating a new generation of readers.
Len Shurtleff
John Mosier's The Myth of the Great War
John Mosier's new book re-examines history with new evidence By Margaret M. Wenzel, A'01 Intern in the Offices of Public Affairs and Publications John Mosier, professor of English literature at Loyola, began writing his fifth and most recent book, The Myth of the Great War, as a guide to visitors to Europe who wanted to know about modern history. Ten years later, Mosier has now written one of the most controversial books about World War I, arguing that America's involvement on the Allied Side has been far more influential than previously thought before. The primary mystery of the conflict, Mosier contends, is that the Allies continued fighting in French trenches under the delusion that German casualties far outweighed those of the French and Belgian. Although the Germans suffered tremendous losses, they did not compare to the unsupportable levels on the French and British sides. The Kirkus Review, the newswire service that reviews books that have reached the potential to become bestsellers, has praised Mosier's book as "a compelling and novel reassessment of WWI military history." The review hails The Myth of the Great War as "a necessary addition to any serious collection of military or WWI history." How did Mosier, an English professor, come to the field of military history? Well, his experiences as an author are as exciting as theories his new book proposes. Adventurous and humble, Mosier will tell you, "I do not think of myself as a historian." Standing in a French graveyard over a decade ago, Mosier recalled how his search for the truth began: "I was standing in this place and I noticed hundreds of graves of soldiers who had died in Verdun in 1917. I had always understood that the battle was fought between February and December of 1916. There was clearly something wrong with the way history was being told. 'What was going on here?' I thought." Mosier got more interested, and as he began to uncover the truth, "it never became any easier." "It was dangerous out there," Mosier relates. "People don't realize that most allied shells did not explode. They penetrated into the ground and the percussion fuses, TNT, never were impacted hard enough to go off," the author explains of his field research while in Verdun. The largest battlefield in the world, the site of incalculable horrors, was the place Mosier began his investigation. "As I have always understood military history, it was as if there were more German casualties than anything elseand why not?," he continues. "No one is really sure how many Belgians were lost in the war. Thousands of unmarked graves will muddle the facts up pretty well if you're not careful." The greatest living British historian, Niall Ferguson, has praised The Myth of the Great War as a fresh new perspective on the subject. "He [Mosier] rightly argues that the crucial factor was their [Germans] superior understanding of the new artillery technology of the period, as well as their better infantry tactics. . . His really deep knowledge of the French military history of 1914-16, backed up by an impressive knowledge of the terrain, results in some truly convincing revisionism." Though Ferguson has stated that he fundamentally disagrees with Mosier's assessment of the American contribution to the war, "there is much else in the book I really admire." Both Mosier and Ferguson used many of the same sources, but Myth improves on, in many respects, the Brit's respected figures. Ferguson has said, "Perhaps the thing I like best is the way he shows how allied propaganda tended to snatch victories from the jaws of defeat, by reporting short-term gains of territory, but not reporting subsequent and often successful German counterattacks. Mosier's point is that the historical narrative of the war has continued to be dominated by the narratives constructed at the same time as the Entente Powers. . . he sets about trying to deconstruct some of these 'victories.'" Mosier's final claim in Myth is the most controversial: he contends that the final allied victory was due to America's participation in the final stages. As the Kirkus Review stated, Mosier's theory is so well supported that, "Historians. . .will be compelled at the very least to come to terms with his argument." What's next for Mosier? "A book about World War II." Using the same methods as in The Myth of the Great War, Mosier's next work should be completed around December of this year. HarperCollins has published the book here in the U.S., and the rights have to been sold to British publishers, Pilot Press.
Mitchell Yockelson's Borrowed Soldiers
Borrowed Soldiers: American under British Command, 1918, Michell A Yockelson, Oklahoma, 2008, 308 + xx pages, photos, maps, appendices, ISBN 978 0 8061 3919 7, $29.95 cloth. The author is an archivist at the National Archives, history teaches at Annapolis, and a frequent speaker at WFA seminars.
This is a superbly crafted analysis of the campaigns of the United States II Corps, The 27th and 30th Divisions, in Flanders at Mount Kimmel then along the Somme. It was these divisions that, despite suffering heavy casualties, broke through the Hindenburg Line along the St Quentin Canal between Vandhuille and Bellicourt in late September 1918. Fighting under command of the Lt. General Sir John Monash’s Australian and New Zealand (ANZAC) Corps, the two divisions continued to advance in attacks along the Selle River extending into October 1918.
Originally created to control several division assigned to the British for training, II Corps was in mid-1918 reduced to an administrative headquarters overseeing only two AEF divisions, the 27th and 30th. Its commanding officer, Major General George W. Read, sensibly ceded tactical command to the British. He had neither the personal expertise nor the staff to exercise tactical control. Despite some misunderstandings, this arrangement and II Corps troops were better led, better armed and better fed than the run- of-the-mill AEF formation. Their troops were armed with British SMLE rifles and Lewis guns, supported entirely by BEF artillery, fed by the British commissary and often tended by the Royal Medical Corps. Some soldiers even wore British uniforms when their American ones wore out.
Several other things are unique about these two divisions. Both were National Guard units topped off with draftees before deployment overseas beginning in February 1918 . The 27th Division was made up of New York state guardsmen; the 30th (Old Hickory Division) of guardsmen from Tennessee, North and South Carolina. Once deployed to Europe, they were neither reinforced with artillery, nor their losses replaced with fresh troops. Thus, unlike other National Guard divisions they never lost their regional character. Also, as alluded to above, these were the only divisions entirely trained, armed and supplied by the British. Finally, the 27th Division was the only AEF division to be commanded from start to finish by a career National Guard officer, Major General John F. O’Ryan, a New York lawyer and long-service graduate of the Command and General Staff College well respected by his professional army peers. While Yockelson does not minimize the frictions inevitable between Americans and British soldiers, he does emphasize the largely positive aspects of the amalgamation.
As you might expect, II Corps performance in battle was sometimes spotty, though their discipline was strong. Plagued with a steep learning curve and a shortage of trained officers and NCOs, poor battlefield communications and confusion over conflicting tactical doctrines pressed on them by British trainers and American staff officers, they sometimes failed. Nonetheless, the author rates their performance as equal that of the best AEF divisions, The First, Second and 26th, particularly in action against a stubborn and expert defense mounted by the Germans at the Hindenburg Line along the St. Quentin Canal in the final 100 days battles of 1918.
Those who travel to the Western Front will recall seeing monuments to the II Corps near Vierstraat Belgium and at Bellicourt, France. Many of the two divisions’ dead are buried at the Somme American Cemetery at Bony. Others, whose bodies were never identified, are memorialized on the Menin Gate in Ypres. In one respect, these are monuments to coalition warfare marking successful cooperation and collaboration that cemented the Anglo-American alliance through two world wars and beyond.
Len Shurtleff
John Terraine's "To Win a War. 1918, The Year of Victory"
At a recent WFA-USA East Coast Chapter event, I received John Terraine’s “To Win a War: 1918, The Year of Victory” as a door prize. It has finally worked its way up the stack of books I have to read, and I just finished it last night. I am glad that I read the book. It is a relatively easy read. Only 235 pages long (excluding index, appendices, etc) the book can be read on your lunch hour in a little over a week. If you are like me, I do much of my reading during my lunch hour, so books in the 250-500 page range are ideal.
“To Win a War” was published in 1978, and for its time I imagine it was considered a bit of a revisionist book, but by the standards of recent works on the Great War it has become conventional. To whit, the Germans lost the war and the Allies actually won it by beating them on the battlefield. It also portrays the Generals and especially Haig as competent professionals and not as uncaring butchers. The book has a decidedly British centric viewpoint of the final year of the war. The revisionist aspects of the book are basically covered in the first couple of chapters in which the author takes David Lloyd George’s view of the war to task.
The book is nine chapters long and the first three chapters deal with the situation both political and militarily of the opposing sides leading up to the eve of the German Spring Offensives. It is here that Terraine details the conflict between Lloyd George and Douglas Haig. 1918 starts with the Government in London dismayed over the cost of the 1917 Offensives and the lack of results. Lloyd George is determined to not repeat 1917, and takes moves to rein in Haig. Some of the actions that he takes is to push the “Superior Direction” of the war onto the Supreme War Council in Versailles. This move caused the ouster of Sir William Robertson as the Chief of the Imperial General Staff, and his replacement by Sir Henry Wilson. Robertson had been Haig’s chief supporter on the Imperial General Staff. Wilson would not be a Haig proponent but a more political general. Additionally, Lloyd George kept the number of replacements provided to the BEF to a minimum. The BEF was forced to reducing the size of a divisions, and break several divisions up in order to bring the rest up to strength. The result of all these actions were that just prior to the impending German attack the BEF was weaker, with a Commander that had to fight London as well as the Germans. Along with discussing the British situation, Terraine also talks about the American and French situation.
By March 1918, the United States had been in the war for almost a year, but still had not managed to field an Army, build any new dreadnoughts, manufacture artillery for the troops it did have in France. The US was coming on much slower than anyone had hoped, and this presented an opportunity for the Germans. One bright spot for the allies were that the French were in much better condition than they had been six months earlier. The government was now headed by Georges Clemenceau, known as the “Tiger”. Gone were the pacifist ministers and those with defeatist attitudes. “Only War, Nothing but War” was the attitude in government. The army was in better shape as well. It had recovered from the mutinies of 1917. Ferdinand Foch was now the Generalissimo in charge of the Supreme War Council and he brought an aggressive spirit to the Front.
Terraine then goes on to describe the German Spring Offensives. He presents a large number of statistics to show that the War in 1918 were consuming men and material not seen since 1914. Contrary to popular myth, the war in the trenches killed less men than a war of Maneuver. While Terraine does detail the German successes, he barely mentions any sense of panic in the allied command at the height of the attacks. From reading this book one would never think that Haig was anything but cool and collected. If anyone became unsettled, it was only the French.
As the German attacks petered out, unable to gain any strategic gains. The allies began to counterattack. The Americans attacking for the first time at Cantigny. Of the early counterattacks Terraine singles out the attack on the village of Le Hamel by the Australian Corp, commanded by Lt. Gen. Monash. This was a set piece attack that featured a combined arms approach - tanks, artillery, and infantry. Monash’s approach was that the infantry was to occupy and hold ground, not take ground. That was the job of the artillery. At Le Hamel, everything went right. It was a textbook victory. The battle even featured several companies of Americans. For me this is one of the more interesting features of the book. Terraine details the role the Americans played in the English sector. Two American divisions fought under British control, and did very well. In some respects, better than those under American command. The Australians, Americans, along with the Canadians would form the shock troops that would spearhead much of the British attacks in 1918.
After Le Hamel, the British wished to repeat that performance on a wider scale. During the Battle of Amiens, they would do just that. 1900 aircraft, 414 tanks, the Australians, Canadians, the Cavalry Corp, along with the rest of the British Fourth Army were committed to battle. Terraine devotes much of an entire chapter to describe this battle, the opening of which, Ludendorff would call the “Black Day” of the German Army. Terraine points out how the war in 1918, and the allied attacks would foreshadow much of what would be seen in World War 2.
After Amiens, the Germans realized that they could not win the war. Terraine spends the rest of the book detailing how each Allied, and especially British attack would cause the German command to become ever more desperate to end the war. Terraine does a good job of showing how the desperation of the German command caused a change in Government in Germany. He also describes how the loss of confidence at the Front caused near revolutionary changes in Germany to point where the situation in Germany began to effect the front. Terraine also describes the hardening of Allied attitudes. The armistice conditions being insisted upon by the French and Pershing basically amounted to a demand for Unconditional Surrender. Unfortunately for Germany, the continuing Allied and especially British success was driving Germany to the point to where she could do nothing but accept the terms.
Terraine details how Haig being aware of the declining manpower situation of his army was pushing for a decision in 1918. Haig was worried that if the war did not end before the winter, the Germans would recover, and be able to fight on possibly into 1920. By the end of 1918 the French were not fighting hard. American losses in the Argonne were causing several formations to be broke up to provide replacements to other divisions. Terraine describes a situation where only the British Army was driving the Germans, and they were reaching the end of their ability to continue to do so. Along with being concerned that demanding terms that might cause the Germans to fight on, Haig was also worried that too harsh of terms would lead not to peace but to another war at a later date.
While “To Win a War” is an interesting book, detailing British accomplishments and attitudes to a degree that I had not read much of previously. It is not without its faults. The Maps in the book are pretty useless. They rarely have the locations marked for the battles being described in the text around the maps. If you are going to pick up a copy of the book, I suggest keeping a WW-I atlas at hand to keep everything in proper perspective.
While being a 30 year old book. Copies of it are available on Abe Books for as little as $1. If you are a student of the Great War I would suggest that would be a dollar well spent.
- Jeffrey Beigie
“To Win a War” was published in 1978, and for its time I imagine it was considered a bit of a revisionist book, but by the standards of recent works on the Great War it has become conventional. To whit, the Germans lost the war and the Allies actually won it by beating them on the battlefield. It also portrays the Generals and especially Haig as competent professionals and not as uncaring butchers. The book has a decidedly British centric viewpoint of the final year of the war. The revisionist aspects of the book are basically covered in the first couple of chapters in which the author takes David Lloyd George’s view of the war to task.
The book is nine chapters long and the first three chapters deal with the situation both political and militarily of the opposing sides leading up to the eve of the German Spring Offensives. It is here that Terraine details the conflict between Lloyd George and Douglas Haig. 1918 starts with the Government in London dismayed over the cost of the 1917 Offensives and the lack of results. Lloyd George is determined to not repeat 1917, and takes moves to rein in Haig. Some of the actions that he takes is to push the “Superior Direction” of the war onto the Supreme War Council in Versailles. This move caused the ouster of Sir William Robertson as the Chief of the Imperial General Staff, and his replacement by Sir Henry Wilson. Robertson had been Haig’s chief supporter on the Imperial General Staff. Wilson would not be a Haig proponent but a more political general. Additionally, Lloyd George kept the number of replacements provided to the BEF to a minimum. The BEF was forced to reducing the size of a divisions, and break several divisions up in order to bring the rest up to strength. The result of all these actions were that just prior to the impending German attack the BEF was weaker, with a Commander that had to fight London as well as the Germans. Along with discussing the British situation, Terraine also talks about the American and French situation.
By March 1918, the United States had been in the war for almost a year, but still had not managed to field an Army, build any new dreadnoughts, manufacture artillery for the troops it did have in France. The US was coming on much slower than anyone had hoped, and this presented an opportunity for the Germans. One bright spot for the allies were that the French were in much better condition than they had been six months earlier. The government was now headed by Georges Clemenceau, known as the “Tiger”. Gone were the pacifist ministers and those with defeatist attitudes. “Only War, Nothing but War” was the attitude in government. The army was in better shape as well. It had recovered from the mutinies of 1917. Ferdinand Foch was now the Generalissimo in charge of the Supreme War Council and he brought an aggressive spirit to the Front.
Terraine then goes on to describe the German Spring Offensives. He presents a large number of statistics to show that the War in 1918 were consuming men and material not seen since 1914. Contrary to popular myth, the war in the trenches killed less men than a war of Maneuver. While Terraine does detail the German successes, he barely mentions any sense of panic in the allied command at the height of the attacks. From reading this book one would never think that Haig was anything but cool and collected. If anyone became unsettled, it was only the French.
As the German attacks petered out, unable to gain any strategic gains. The allies began to counterattack. The Americans attacking for the first time at Cantigny. Of the early counterattacks Terraine singles out the attack on the village of Le Hamel by the Australian Corp, commanded by Lt. Gen. Monash. This was a set piece attack that featured a combined arms approach - tanks, artillery, and infantry. Monash’s approach was that the infantry was to occupy and hold ground, not take ground. That was the job of the artillery. At Le Hamel, everything went right. It was a textbook victory. The battle even featured several companies of Americans. For me this is one of the more interesting features of the book. Terraine details the role the Americans played in the English sector. Two American divisions fought under British control, and did very well. In some respects, better than those under American command. The Australians, Americans, along with the Canadians would form the shock troops that would spearhead much of the British attacks in 1918.
After Le Hamel, the British wished to repeat that performance on a wider scale. During the Battle of Amiens, they would do just that. 1900 aircraft, 414 tanks, the Australians, Canadians, the Cavalry Corp, along with the rest of the British Fourth Army were committed to battle. Terraine devotes much of an entire chapter to describe this battle, the opening of which, Ludendorff would call the “Black Day” of the German Army. Terraine points out how the war in 1918, and the allied attacks would foreshadow much of what would be seen in World War 2.
After Amiens, the Germans realized that they could not win the war. Terraine spends the rest of the book detailing how each Allied, and especially British attack would cause the German command to become ever more desperate to end the war. Terraine does a good job of showing how the desperation of the German command caused a change in Government in Germany. He also describes how the loss of confidence at the Front caused near revolutionary changes in Germany to point where the situation in Germany began to effect the front. Terraine also describes the hardening of Allied attitudes. The armistice conditions being insisted upon by the French and Pershing basically amounted to a demand for Unconditional Surrender. Unfortunately for Germany, the continuing Allied and especially British success was driving Germany to the point to where she could do nothing but accept the terms.
Terraine details how Haig being aware of the declining manpower situation of his army was pushing for a decision in 1918. Haig was worried that if the war did not end before the winter, the Germans would recover, and be able to fight on possibly into 1920. By the end of 1918 the French were not fighting hard. American losses in the Argonne were causing several formations to be broke up to provide replacements to other divisions. Terraine describes a situation where only the British Army was driving the Germans, and they were reaching the end of their ability to continue to do so. Along with being concerned that demanding terms that might cause the Germans to fight on, Haig was also worried that too harsh of terms would lead not to peace but to another war at a later date.
While “To Win a War” is an interesting book, detailing British accomplishments and attitudes to a degree that I had not read much of previously. It is not without its faults. The Maps in the book are pretty useless. They rarely have the locations marked for the battles being described in the text around the maps. If you are going to pick up a copy of the book, I suggest keeping a WW-I atlas at hand to keep everything in proper perspective.
While being a 30 year old book. Copies of it are available on Abe Books for as little as $1. If you are a student of the Great War I would suggest that would be a dollar well spent.
- Jeffrey Beigie
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| Started By | Thread Subject | Replies | Last Post | ||
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| Joerookery | Introduction and Handbook of Imperial Germany | 0 | Nov 4 2009, 5:08 AM EST by Joerookery | ||
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Thread started: Nov 4 2009, 5:08 AM EST
Watch
Hi,
We are members from San Antonio Texas. And unfortunately while we cannot join you this month for your seminar we are pleased to announce the completion of our latest book on "Handbook of Imperial Germany ". This has been met with a lot of very kind words, saying that this book had been needed for decades. I would be glad to send you a copy of the "plug "if you fill out the contact information on my website www.pickelhauben.net I am not sure how to edit pictures etc. on this. Otherwise I would post the table of contents and sample pages. I expected to be reviewed this month by both the British and American WFA. At 333 pages with 183 pictures and over 670 footnotes, this is an attempt to explain the intricacies of how the country worked -- militarily, politically, and socially. “I must say the 'Handbook' is a pretty impressive piece of work and one that has been long needed. Its approach - background, politics and then the army - works well. I thought I had a bit of a handle on 'the German Army' - I know now that this is an inaccurate title - and I now know how poor a handle I had. Full of fascinating and important facts and detail. No index sadly - big mistake. My copy, ordered Wednesday, arrived Friday. Hard, actually impossible, not to recommend the book highly. I am hoping to do a review for Stand To, something I only rarely do for books I have actually paid for!!” You can find the book on eBay. Just search the title or from the publisher for $25 http://www.authorhouse.com/BookStore/ItemDetail.aspx?bookid=60521 |
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| meyati | Does anybody know anything about Hew Strachan? | 2 | Oct 2 2009, 10:58 AM EDT by JOELNORMAN | ||
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Thread started: Jun 28 2009, 6:44 PM EDT
Watch
I'm curious about Hew Strachan since I've been watching the specials on WW I on the Military Channel. It's based on his books and he's listed as the main writer. It has letters, photos and interviews from soldiers and civilians on all sides-Turks, Serbians, French, Scots, Russians, Prussians, Welch, English in general, Belgians, Germans in general. The footage of the Italian Front in the Alps is stupendous. Who would have thought that there is so much video footage of WW I in existance? Like the Serbian retreat/exile is a re-creation from a movie the Serbs made during the 1920s or 30s, so the sources are labeled fairly clear.
Do you find this valuable?
Keyword tags:
exciting
Hew Strachan
history
military channel
WW I
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| meyati | Cheap sourse of WW I history books | 2 | Feb 12 2009, 10:16 AM EST by meyati | ||
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Thread started: Feb 11 2009, 11:06 PM EST
Watch
"Labyrinth Books" is a publisher associated with university presses. They specialize in university press books. The January sale catalog has several books about WW I, and societies during WW I. "The Ottoman Empire" published by Cambridge & $15.95 US; "European Culture in the Great War: The Arts, Entertainment and propaganda, 1914-1918" published by Cambridge & $14.98 US; "Fallen Soldiers: Reshaping the Memory of the World Wars" published by Oxford & $6.98. This is how WW I helped develope the "hero" syndrome in the public mind-I haven't read it; "The Cross of Iron: The Rise of the German War Machine, 1914-1945", published by Henry Holt & $7.95. It has an explanation of how germany succeeded until the Americans went to war. Two possible books that might go with "The Cross of Iron" are: "Empire, Welfare State, Europe: History of the United Kingdom, 1906-2001" published by Oxford & $12.98 US and "English Culture and the Decline of the Industrial Spirit. 1850-1980", published by Cambridge & $14.98. English Culture documents the author's, Martin Joel Wiener, opinion that the mores of England changed England's history in more than one aspect. I just see these 3 books complementing each other and making a set. The minimum order is $25, Email: <catalog@labyrinthbooks.com>, FAX (914) 762-6261, address: Labyrinth Sale Catalog 358 Saw Mill River Rd. Millwood Business center Millwood, NY 10546 Main Stores: Labyrinth Books@Princeton 116-122 Nassau St. Princeton, NJ 08540 and Labyrinth Books 290 York St. New Haven, CT 06511
I'm considered a history book reviewer, so I have access to the off of the road books. I haven't read these, but I'm interested .
1
out of
1 found this valuable.
Do you?
Keyword tags:
sale
University press books
unusual books. WW I
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